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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest
of H
,F
R
(06-24-65) a
person under eighteen years of age.
F
R
H
, by his next of kin
and friends and custodians JOSE LUJAN
and MAGGIE LUJAN,

Civil No.

Plaintiffs and Appellant,

13918

vs.
MARILYN BAKER, CHRIS V. SAIZ and
MRS. CHRIS V. SAIZ, his wife,
Defendants and Responaients.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the Appellants, Jose and Maggie
Lujan, from an order entered in the Second District Juvenile Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah denying the petition for extraordinary writ and keeping custody and guardianship of F
R
H
in the Utah State Division of Family Services.

1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff-Appellants, Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan,
petitioned the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Jay E.
Banks, presiding, fora writ of habeas corpus in behalf of the minor
child F
R
H
At a hearing before the court on
September 24, 1974, the Court ordered "that the question of
custody and guardianship of F
R
H
be and is hereby
certified to the Second District Juvenile Court, State of Utah,
based upon Utah Code Annotated 55-10-78." (R. 38) The
Juvenile Court, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding upon
proper hearing, did find and order that custody of the child F
R
H
was continous since 1971, that the Petitioners did
not have standing to bring the petition, and that the child was not
being illegally detained as indicated by hearings and orders entered
by the Juvenile Court in 1971. Therefore, the petition for writ of
habeas corpus was denied by the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the order entered denying the
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the Petitioner-Appellants
did not have standing and that the child was not being illegally
detained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly after the birth of F
R
H
, the Petitioners
Jose and Maggie Lujan, the great uncle and great aunt of the child,
took F
R
H
into their home to take care of him and
provide him with the necessities of life (R. 40). In 1971, the
Second District Juvenile Court, the Honorable Judge Regnal
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Garff, presiding, permanently deprived the natural parents of any
and all rights in the child, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 55-10-109, and placed custody of him in the Division of
Family Services. (R. 2)
Thereafter, the Division of Family Services executed a valid
agreement with the Petitioners Jose and Maggie Lujan making the
Lujans the Foster Parents of F
R
H
with the right
that either party — with notice — could remove the child or have
him removed from the Lujan Home. (R. 5)
In 1974, the Division of Family Services, pursuant to the rights
of custody of F
R
H
, made the decision to take
F
R
H
out of the home of Petitioners and place him
in the home of defendants Mr. and Mrs. Chris V. Saiz. To
effectuate this change, Defendant Marilyn Baker, a Social Worker
for the Division of Family Services placed the child in the Saiz's
home. All the foregoing was done with notice to the Petitioners (R.
5) and by Court order dated September 5, 1974.
Thereafter, the Petitioners, without right or authority, took
F
R
H
out of the home of defendants, Saiz, and
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Third Judicial District
Court. In the meantime, Michael Stead, Attorney for the County,
filed an affidavit and order to show cause why the Petitioners
should not be held in contempt of court regarding the removal of
the child and why they should not relinquish physical custody of
said child (R. 33). Hearing on this order was never held and all
parties came before the Court on the Petitioner for writ of habeas
corpus.
The Juvenile Court found, as per the findings of fact, that the
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Petitioners did not have standing since they had no rights in the
child, that the child was not being illegally detained, and that the
petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
From this order, the Appellants appeal the decision of the
Juvenile Court. Respondents respectfully refer the court to
§55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended, 1965)
wherein it is specified that the name of the child shall not appear on
the record in an appeal from the Juvenile Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
CHANGING THE HEADING OF THE CASE AT
BAR IN LIGHT OF THE COURT'S CONTINUING
JURISDICTION OF THE MATTER OF CUSTODY
OF THE MINOR CHILD.
The Appellants make an attempt to show through statutory and
constitutional language that the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the extraordinary writs as sought in the case at bar. In so
doing, Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78 is cited, but only
in part. Had the Appellants cited the entire statutory language of
the pertinent portion of that section, there would be no question
that the Juvenile Court acted properly in changing the name of the
case to that which showed the proper Juvenile Court relationship.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78, provides:
"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the district
courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child,
nor of jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child
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upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of
custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in
the district court; 44provided that in case a petition
involving the same child is pending in the juvenile court
or the juvenile court has previously acquired continuing
jurisdiction over the same child, the district court shall
certify the question of custody to the juvenile court for
determination." (emphasis added)
The record clearly indicates the order of certification to the
Second District Juvenile Court (R. 38) was entered for the determination of the entire matter, since the only matter before the
District Court was whether the Lujans had any custody to assert.
The Juvenile Court had continuing jurisdiction of the minor child
pursuant to the order entered by the same court, Judge Garff
presiding, in 1971, and as such the District Court deferred to that
already existing jurisdiction of the Court and as per Utah Code
Annotated, Section 55-10-78 certified the entire matter to the
Juvenile Court.
The Appellants do not raise the issue of continuing jurisdiction
on appeal, nor was it contested in the Juvenile Court. Therefore, it
must be assumed by the Respondent that objection to such jurisdiction is waived by Appellants.
This indicated most clearly that the District Court acted properly in the certification, and that the Juvenile Court properly
changed the titled of the case to show the status in the Juvenile
Court.
Nevertheless, the mere change of title or heading is not
paramount to the issues involved in this appeal. This issue is not
material to the disposition of the case, but if this court should find

5
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that the Juvenile Court erred in its action, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 61 should apply. This rule states that:
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
It is therefore seen that Argument I of the Appellants is without
merit and must therefore be dismissed.
POINT II
NO EVIDENCE WAS NEEDED FOR THE DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION SINCE THE ORDER
WAS MADE ON LEGAL RATHER THAN
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES.
Appellants totally fail to distinguish the difference between
dismissing a case on "legal" issues as compared to dismissing a
case on "factual" evidence. When it is clearly understood that the
case at bar was dismissed on a " legal'' issue — standing — there is
no need for evidence to be introduced which would go to the merits
of the petition.
Page 10 of Appellants Brief states as follows:
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"The appellants were deprived of the privilege of
showing that the juvenile court never had jurisdiction
and to show the fact that Roger was never a neglected or
dependent child."
The fact is simply that the jurisdictional question was decided
in 1971 before Judge Garff and that the time for appeal had long
since run, thus precluding this argument from being raised. The
Court had jurisdiction originally, and has since continued such
jurisdiction — even to the granting of the order to remove the child
from the home of the Lujans. This issue is long since waived.
The Juvenile Court further declared, as the Respondents wish
to emphasize, that the Appellants never have had legal custody
(other than physical custody) since the parents were still alive and
in 1971 the Court terminated all such parental rights and placed the
child in the custody of the Division of Family Services.
The cases cited by Appellants, therefore, do not bear on the
question before this Court on appeal. No one is contending that the
Lujans did not care for the child as was the issue in In Re Bradley
et.al.v. Miller et.ux., 109 Utah 538, 167 P.2d 978 (1946) as cited
by Appellants, but rather the Court herein stated:
"Well, the question is what rights do they have. You
see, that's what Mr. Stead is saying. They have no
rights. Based on that foster care agreement that they
signed, the arrangement could be terminated at any
time, at the option of Family Services, not. .. .Yes,
yes, sure I think everybody recognizes the equitable
aspects of this whole thing but just based on strict legal
interpretation. I don't think they have any standing.
We've never held that a foster parent had any standing
here." (R. 9)

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Further, the Court said:
"Look, Mr. Robbins, this is what I'm stuck with. I'm
stuck with Judge Garff's order dated March 9, 1971,
which reads as follows. 'All parental rights of the
mother and the father are permanently terminated and
legal custody and guardianship of the person of the
above child is placed with the Utah State Division of
Family Services, a licensed child-placing agency for
placement in a suitable adoptive home. The Division of
Family Services is hereby ordered to pay for the support
and maintenance of said child until the adoptive placement is made.' That's what I've got and that's what
we're dealing with and what I feel personally, what the
moral issue is — you know. That's what I meant when I
said I am stuck with this order. And the child is not
being illegally detained by any stretch of the imagination because Family Services has legal custody. And
what I feel I have to do and what I would like to do are
two different things." (R. 13)
As indicated above, the legal issue of standing and prior continuing custody controlled in the Juvenile Court. These are legal issues
where no factual evidence is needed. The Court dismissed the case
for these reasons.
Because of the continuing nature of the Court's jurisdiction,
Judge Whitmer and Attorney Robbins had the following dialogue:
"Judge Whitmer:
Well, all I'm saying is that I don't think a Writ of
Habeas Corpus is the proper way to get it before the
Court because the child is not being illegally detained.
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Golden Robbins:
Well, it was. Today, it's not. It's in the custody of the
Lujans but the day that the Writ was issued it was in the
custody or the possession of Mrs. Baker and Mrs. Saiz.
Judge Whitmer:
Who has every right to pick up that child from any
foster placement.
Golden Robbins:
Which I'll have to disagree with, your honor. I don't
think they have a right to take it from the Lujans. They
might have the right, I don't know what rights they do
have to be very frank with you but.. .
Judge Whitmer:
That agreement indicates there that the foster placement can be terminated at reasonable notice by either
party and they are a party to that agreement. They have
been receiving foster care payments from the Division
of Family Services since the child was placed there."
(R.7)
Thus from a legal standpoint, the Lujans had no rights upon
which to remain in Court and the Court properly granted the
motion to dismiss propounded by the Defendants, which motion
needed no evidence as claimed by the Appellants.

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE JUVENILE COURT HAD PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THE LUJANS AND THE QUESTION RAISED REGARDING JURISDICTION
OVER F
R
H
IS IMPROPERLY
RAISED ON APPEAL.
At the outset of Point II, Appellants claim there is an Order to
Show Cause erroneously in the records, yet use this appeal as the
forum to propound their position relative to it. Respondents contend that this entire segment of Appellants' Brief is improperly
before this Court.
The issue presented to the Juvenile Court by Appellants was
whether the placing of F
R
H
with a new Foster
Family detained him illegally — hence the petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. Point III of the Appellants' Brief does not speak to
that issue but attempts to attack the original jurisdiction over the
child more than 3 years after time for appeal in that original action
had run. Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-112 sets forth the
only criteria by which jurisdiction or other objections can be made
and/or challenged, on appeal. At the time of the original order in
1971 no appeal was taken, jurisdiction was not challenged and as
the record indicated (R. 10) all parties with rights and interests in
the outcome of the action were at those original hearings and had
every opportunity to follow Utah procedure to effectuate challenges.
Further, there is no indication that the Lujans complained of
jurisdiction when the Division of Family Services placed F
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R
H
in their home, or when they signed the contractual
agreement with the Division that gave the Division authority to
remove F
R
H
upon due notice. Instead, through
petitioning for an extraordinary writ they are attempting to attack
collaterally the proper original jurisdiction over the child and their
acquiescence in the entire proceedings. Simply because the Division of Family Services exercised its option under the agreement
with Court approval to their disadvantage does not give the Lujans
the right, or make them proper parties, to raise these issues at this
time. This Court has consistently held that the Writ of Habeas
Corpus is not a substitute for appellate review. In State v. Morgan,
U.2d
, 527 P.2d 226 (1974) this Court held:
"The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for the
purpose of procuring what in substance and effect is a
second appeal, whether it is prosecuted pending the
appeal or thereafter." (Emphasis added)
In this present action, the Appellants are trying to raise issues
that were never originally appealed more or less after an appeal had
been taken. This is totally improper with the dictates of this court
and should be disregarded as bearing on the issue of standing and
dismissal of the petition.
The Appellants state in their brief on Page 11:
'' If there had been any part of the Juvenile Court record
put in evidence, the Appellants would have contested
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court."
None of this record alluded to was introduced in evidence, yet
the Appellants complained about something that was not and is not
in the record and is not pertinent to the entire matter. The petition
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was dismissed on legal grounds as expressed in Point II and did not
need go to the introduction of evidence. The Appellants cannot
now claim that the Court should take judicial notice of something
that is not in the record. The Appellants fail to point out to this
Court why they are the proper parties to raise the petition and
where the Court erred in dismissing the action.
Regarding jurisdiction of the Lujans as raised by Appellants
the thrust of the contention is confusing; Respondent presumes
reference is made to the present action. If this is a correct presumption, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in District
Court, thereby subjecting themselves to jurisdiction of that Court.
That Court properly certified the question to the Juvenile Court.
The fact that the petition was brought by Appellants in behalf of
F
R
H
gives the Court complete jurisdiction over
them, for once the Court has jurisdiction over the minor (which it
did, here) those guardians, next friends, etc., likewise are under
the jurisdiction of the Court.
If, by chance, the Appellants are referring to the 1971 hearing,
the Lujans never had any rights in the case at that time, for legal
custody of the child was the issue before the Court and before
parental rights were terminated such legal custody was in the
natural parents and not the Lujans. The Lujans were not required to
have a day in Court because they had no legal rights to assert. The
Juvenile Court made this extremely clear as Page 9 of the record:
Golden Robbins:
But I don't think, I don't think the Court, the Juvenile
Court, doesn't have any jurisdiction in the first place in
these proceedings that you have out here that those are
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not a jurisdictional question. The Lujans were not made
a party to those proceedings.
Judge Whitmer:
They are not entitled to be.
Michael Stead:
They don't have to be made a party.
Judge Whitmer:
They don't have to be made a party.
Golden Robbins:
Well, I don't think you can take anybody's rights away
from them without....
Judge Whitmer:
Well, the question is what rights do they have. You see,
that's what Mr. Stead is saying. They have no rights.
Based on that foster care agreement that they signed,
the arrangement could be terminated at any time, at the
option of Family Services, no . . . "
Further, the record is clear, that Appellants were attempting to
use habeas corpus as a method to challenge the purely administrative decision of the Division of Family Services which has nothing
to do with the child being illegally detained. Mr. Robbins, counsel
for Appellants, stated:
"I was hoping that we could get the evidence in as to
the care of the infant and . . . " (R. 8)
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Thereafter Judge Whitmer responded:
"I don't think anybody is arguing that the Lujans have
not been adequate foster parents up to this point. If they
hadn't been, Family Services would have removed the
child. That's not the point. I think that the Family
Services made an administrative decision based on the
age and health of the Lujans." (R. 8)
The attempt to get such evidence in is surely an attempt to get
the Juvenile Court to over turn the Division of Family Services
order without going through the process of appealing the decision
of the Division directly. The use of habeas corpus as the substitute
for petitioning the Division for the reconsideration of the facts
relative to care and support of the child (which was not done here
as far as the record indicates) is improper.
As the Court pointed out on Page 6 and 7 of the records:
Judge Whitmer:
The point is that Family Services administratively can
do anything they want to. I suppose that the Lujans
might have some kind of. . . .1 don't know whether a
civil action against Family Services would lie for damages. That' another issue. But, on the issue of illegal
detention, the child is in the custody of Family Services, not in the custody of the Lujans, and Family
Services simply move, in effect, out of a foster home,
which they have every right to d o . "
# # #
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"Well, all I'm saying is that I don't think a writ of
habeas corpus is the proper way to get it before the
Court because the child is not being illegally detained."
Thus, it is clearly seen that the cases cited by appellants to
support their contention regarding "neglected, dependent, or delinquent" children which would allow the Juvenile Court to invoke jurisdiction (In re State in the Interest of Graham, 110 Utah
159, 170 P.2d 172 (1946)) add nothing to the issues before this
Court, for there is nothing in the entire record which would allow
this Court to make a decision thereon.
Respondent respectfully urges this Court to recognize the
actual issue before this Court—why the petition was dismissed —
and disregard the points raised by Appellant which do not bear on
that decision. This Court has long held that issues not presented for
the trial judge to rule on may not be raised on appeal. State v.
Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965).
POINT IV
THE JUVENILE COURT RULED PROPERLY
THAT THE CASE AT BAR NEED NOT BE RETURNED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR
FURTHER DETERMINATION.
Appellants focus their final argument and case law support on
the wrong provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78.
There are two mutually exclusive provisions pertaining to custody
matters and the Appellants have not reached the crucial language
which is dispositive of this case. Appellants quote State of Utah in
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the Interest ofRae Lyn Thornton, 18 Utah 2d 297, 422 P.2d 199
(1967) as support for their view that the Juvenile Court is required
to send the case back to the District Court. That case interpreted the
one provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78 which
states:
"' A district court may at any time decline to pass upon a
question of custody and may certify that question to the
juvenile court for determination or recommendation.''
This provision was instituted primarily for situations where the
Juvenile Court had no relationship with the parties and when the
District Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
parties. It is a matter quite understandable that the District Court
might desire to have the expertise of the Juvenile Court help in the
determination of the interests of the minor children. But neither
Thornton nor Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 89, 416 P.2d 308
(1966), nor In re State in the Interest of Valdez, 29 Utah 2d 63, 504
P.2d 1372 (1973) cited by Appellants, is a situation where the
Juvenile Court already had jurisdiction over the matter before the
case was filed in District Court. Surely, those cases are correct in
their analysis that if the Juvenile Court has nothing to do with the
parties, the subject matter, or the case at all, the District Court
cannot divest itself of jurisdiction.
In the present action, however, the Juvenile Court had continuing jurisdiction over the entire matter before, during, and after the
time when the petition was filed in District Court. Therefore, the
provision, which the cases cited above interpret, is not pertinent or
applicable to this case. As cited earlier under Respondent's Point I,
the following language of Utah Code Annoted, Section 55-10-78
is the applicable statute:
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"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the District
Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child,
nor of jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child
upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of
custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in
the district court;provided that in case a petition involving the same child is pending in the juvenile court or the
juvenile court has previously acquired continuing
jurisdiction over the same child, the district court shall
certify the question of custody to the juvenile court for
determination." (Emphasis added)
If the above language was to mean nothing different from that
language cited by Appellant, then the whole purpose of "spelling
out" the procedure when the Juvenile Court already had prior
continuing jurisdiction would be moot. Such an interpretation
cannot be reached. The legislature specifically enacted the above
language to require by use of the command'' shall certify'' that the
District Court transmit the entire proceedings if the issue in the writ
involves only the child and the Juvenile Court had prior continuing
jurisdiction.
InAnderson, supra, the Court said that when the District Court
"has taken jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court may
be invoked.. .but its action must be regarded as supplementary to
the action of the District Court.'' This is in total harmony with the
position of Respondent and the language of the statute for when the
Juvenile Court already has jurisdiction over the minor child, any
writ of habeas corpus must be certified to the Juvenile Court for
matters concerning custody, for otherwise the District Court
would be usurping its position to defeat the entire purpose of the
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Juvenile System as it relates to wards of the state and in effect all
persons who are in the custody of the Division of Family Services.
Therefore, Respondent strongly opposes Appellants argument
and urges that the foregoing analysis is correct and proper and that
this Court reject the contention of Appellants.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent respectfully submits that the certification of
the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Juvenile Court was
proper, that the case was decided on a legal point not requiring the
introduction of evidence, and that this case under the foregoing
circumstances need not be referred back to the District Court for
further proceedings.
Therefore, it is urged that this Court affirm the decision of the
Juvenile Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
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